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Updates from the International Criminal Tribunals
International Criminal Court
Kenya Continues to Seek Deferral
in ICC Cases
Kenya has lost its latest bid to defer two
cases against former government officials
currently pending before the International
Criminal Court (ICC). On May 30, 2011,
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected the
Kenyan Government’s challenges to the
admissibility of the cases under Article 19
of the Rome Statute. The concurrent judgments from the Chamber stated that the
Government’s challenge “did not provide
concrete evidence of ongoing proceedings before national judges,” as required
by Article 17’s admissibility standards.
The judgment is the latest setback for the
Kenyan Government that has been struggling for months in multiple settings to
defer the ICC’s prosecution of six of its
government officials accused of international crimes that took place following the
2008 presidential elections.
In February 2011, Kenyan President
Emilio Mwai Kibaki met with 23 Kenyan
envoys to develop strategies to convince
the United Nations (UN) to defer the pending cases. Article 16 of the Rome Statute
states that an investigation or prosecution
may be deferred for a period of twelve
months if a “resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, has requested the Court to that
effect . . . .”
For the Security Council to adopt a
Chapter VII resolution, however, it must
determine that if an investigation or prosecution were to proceed, such actions could
result in a threat to international peace and
security. Several countries have expressed
their doubts as to the validity of such an
argument. The United States Ambassador
to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, stated
publicly that the United States would
likely veto Kenya’s request for a deferral of the two cases presently before the
Court if it were submitted for a vote to
the UN Security Council. British High
Commissioner to Kenya Rob Macaire
shared a similar sentiment. During an
informal interactive dialogue between

Kenya and the Security Council on March
18, Kenya made its Article 16 argument,
but members of the Council generally
agreed that the situation in Kenya does not
amount to a threat to international peace
and security, and that the ICC would be
the best venue for Kenya to challenge
admissibility. Following Kenya’s official
application to the UN for deferral, the
UN Security Council failed to reach any
agreement during an April 9 meeting —
in essence defeating Kenya’s application.
Without credible evidence that the investigation would lead to unrest, it is difficult to
imagine that the Security Council would be
willing to interfere with the ICC’s jurisdiction, as doing so would severely undermine
the Court’s authority.
Kenya’s clearest path to a termination of
the ICC case was thought to be by appealing
directly to the ICC rather than the Security
Council. Kenyan officials continue to argue
that the ICC is a “court of last resort,” and
that under the principle of complementarity, there should be no investigation unless
Kenya does not make a genuine effort to set
up a local judicial process to investigate or
try the accused. Article 53(4) of the Rome
Statute provides that “[t]he Prosecutor may,
at any time, reconsider a decision whether to
initiate an investigation or prosecution based
on new facts or information.” Kenya filed
its application challenging the admissibility
of the cases before the ICC on March 31 and
asserted that it is capable of investigating the
alleged crimes. While it was thought that the
Kenyan Government’s best hopes lied with
the discretion of the ICC, the recent decision rejecting the Government’s assertions
makes a deferral increasingly unlikely.
Failing to show that Kenya is able and
willing to conduct an investigation, a final
option might be an amendment to Article
16 of the Rome Statute, as proposed by the
African Union (AU) in November 2009.
The amendment proposes to allow the UN
General Assembly authority to defer an
investigation should the Security Council
fail to act on such a request. This proposed amendment, however, is unlikely
to garner the support it needs to pass.
Aside from altering the Rome Statute,
this amendment would require that the
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Security Council cede more authority to
the General Assembly — something it has
not been historically willing to do since the
formation of the UN. During the Sixteenth
Ordinary Session of the AU, the Assembly
called upon African States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the ICC to join together
“to ensure that the proposal for amendment to Article 16 of the Rome Statute is
properly addressed during the forthcoming
negotiations and to report to the Assembly
through the Commission.” Even if a united
front of African States Parties supported
this amendment, however, it is not clear
that they could effect a change. A threat to
depart from the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute would not necessarily
be effective, as the ICC would be reluctant
to set a precedent by acquiescing to such
demands. Additionally, withdrawal from
the ICC’s jurisdiction does not take effect
for one year from the moment of notification and has no bearing on cases initiated
prior to withdrawal.
The Government of Kenya may, by June
5, 2011, file an appeal against the ICC PreTrial Chamber decisions, in accordance
with article 82(1)(a) of the Rome Statute
and rule 154.1 of the Rules and Procedure
and Evidence. At the time of this writing, no additional appeals to the Security
Council or the ICC have been filed.

ICC Opens Initial Case In Libyan
Situation
On March 3, 2011, International
Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo
(the
Prosecutor)
announced the opening of an investigation into possible crimes against humanity committed from February 15, 2011,
onwards by Libyan “Security Forces.” The
investigation comes as a result of Security
Council Resolution 1970 (2011), which
highlights the “grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and
condemn[s] the violence and use of force
against civilians.” The resolution, which
was adopted on February 26, referred the
situation to the ICC. Security Council
referral under Chapter VII of the United
Nations is the only way that the ICC is
given jurisdiction to proceed with an inves-
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tigation in situations that do not include
States Parties to the Rome Statute.
On May 4, 2011, the Prosecutor issued
an initial report to the UN Security Council
indicating that the number of dead since
February 15 is “in the thousands.” The
report reveals that the “available information provides reasonable grounds to believe
that crimes against humanity have been
committed and continue being committed
in Libya.”
Following the Security Council report,
on May 16 the Prosecutor filed an application for arrest with ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
I to issue arrest warrants against Muammar
Abu Minya Gaddafi, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi
and the Head of the Intelligence Abdullah
Al Senussi for crimes against humanity
committed in Libya since February 2011.
Specifically, the application charges that
Muammar Gaddafi “conceived and implemented, through persons of his inner circle
such as his son Saif Al Islam Gaddafi and
Abdullah Al Senussi, a plan to suppress
any challenge to his absolute authority
through killings and other acts of persecution” executed by Libyan Security Forces.
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC
provides that a “crime against humanity”
means, among other acts, murder, extermination, rape, and torture “when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack . . . .” As the
first case brought in the Libyan situation,
the application explicitly states that the
initial charges are only for crimes against
humanity committed against civilians and
do not include war crimes committed during the armed conflict that started at the
end of February.
If allegations that security forces have
attacked peaceful demonstrators en masse
are accurate and unambiguous links to
those in control are established, the case for
crimes against humanity, as charged in the
Prosecutor’s initial filings, appears clear.
The situation becomes much murkier, however, if the Prosecutor decides to bring
additional charges relating to war crimes
under Article 8 of the Statute that may have
been committed after the start of the armed
conflict. The initial Security Council report
indicates that there is information indicating attacks against civilians not taking a
direct part in hostilities have taken place, as
well as attacks directed “against buildings
dedicated to religion, education, art, sci-

ence or charitable purposes,” which would
meet Article 8 definitions of triable war
crimes.
One of the first challenges, however,
will be determining whether those killed
in Libya are accurately described as civilians. The Prosecutor has said that Libyan
authorities decided that they were willing
to kill unarmed protestors opposing Libyan
leader Mummar Gaddafi’s rule even
before the conflict began. International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) director-general Yves Daccord has stressed that
attacks directly targeting civilian populations are prohibited by international
humanitarian law. However, Libyan government officials will likely argue that
many of those referred to as civilians, in
fact, do not qualify as non-combatants.
Civilians who directly participate in hostilities (DPH) lose their protected status
under the Geneva Conventions, and can be
legitimately targeted according to international humanitarian law. However, DPH is
not explicitly defined within international
law and remains the subject of constant
debate between states and international
organizations. It is also possible that civilians who have taken up arms in rebellion
could be considered freedom fighters, or
combatants seeking the independence of a
country, a protected class under the Geneva
Conventions.
A final defense for those accused of
war crimes within the Libyan conflict may
be to seek a defense through Article 31(c)
of the Rome Statute. Article 31(c) provides
that a person will not be criminally responsible if, during their conduct:
The person acts reasonably to
defend himself or herself or
another person or, in the case of
war crimes, property which is
essential for the survival of the
person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against
an imminent and unlawful use of
force in a manner proportionate to
the degree of danger to the person
or the other person or property
protected . . . .
The defense under Article 31(c) could
be argued concurrent with assertions of
DPH. If a significant number of civilians
could instead be labeled as combatants,
it would be far easier for Libyan heads of
state to argue that their attacks were essen57

tial for accomplishing a military action,
such as quelling an uprising.
The Prosecutor has stated that investigations are proceeding in the Libyan
situation but, to date, has not brought any
charges relating to war crimes. Pre-Trial
Chamber I must now decide whether to
accept the Prosecutor’s request, reject it, or
ask the Office of the Prosecutor for more
evidence.
Slava Kuperstein, a J.D. candidate at
the Washington College of Law, covers the
International Criminal Court for the Human
Rights Brief.

International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
Trial Chamber to Allow Evidence
Outside Temporal Jurisdiction of
ICTR
On February 3, 2011, in Ngirabatware,
Trial Chamber II of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
denied the Defence Motion to Exclude
Evidence Falling Outside the Temporal
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited to crimes
committed in 1994. The defense sought to
exclude testimony from three prosecution
witnesses that shows the accused allegedly
attended meetings in 1993 at which attacks
against Tutsis were planned. Although
consideration of evidence outside the tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction is controversial,
the Trial Chamber appropriately denied the
motion because it ultimately has the discretion to consider such evidence when it is
relevant and has probative value.
During negotiations establishing the
ICTR, Rwanda proposed that the jurisdiction of the tribunal encompass not only the
April 1994 genocide, but also its related
causes stemming from the beginning of the
armed conflict in 1990. The UN Security
Council rejected this proposition on the
basis that applying Chapter VII powers
to extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal
to 1990 would be inappropriate because
the armed conflict prior to 1994 was not
a sufficient threat to international peace
and security. However, pursuant to Rule
89(C) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, the tribunal can “admit any
relevant evidence which it deems to have
probative value,” even if such evidence
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concerns events falling outside the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR.
While the defense in Ngirabatware
recognized the Trial Chamber’s power to
consider evidence outside the temporal
jurisdiction of the ICTR, it argued that
the evidence at issue did not fulfill any of
the purposes articulated by the Appeals
Chamber in Nahimana for considering
such evidence. In Nahimana, the Appeals
Chamber held that a Trial Chamber could
admit evidence concerning events outside
1994 if, for example, it clarifies a given
context, establishes by inference the elements of criminal conduct occurring in
1994, or demonstrates a deliberate pattern
of conduct. The prosecution argued that
the witness testimony concerning the 1993
events demonstrates a deliberate pattern
of criminal conduct in planning attacks
against Tutsis that continued into 1994,
but the defense asserted that the evidence
did not demonstrate such a pattern and
should therefore be excluded. The Trial
Chamber ultimately held that the purposes
listed in Nahimana were illustrative but
not exhaustive. However, the defense also
argued that evidence capable of establishing independent crimes should be excluded
because it may lead to convictions per se,
such as an automatic conviction based on
the accused’s mere presence at meetings.
It has been suggested that admitting
evidence outside the temporal jurisdiction gives the tribunal a way to exercise jurisdiction over crimes beyond those
permitted by its statute. This possibility should be of concern to any tribunal
with limited jurisdiction to ensure it does
not overstep its legal authority, but the
ICTR in Ngirabatware does not wrongly
exercise jurisdiction merely by admitting
evidence concerning events before 1994.
Theoretically, the evidence concerning the
accused’s alleged attendance at meetings
where genocide was planned may create
the danger of conviction per se for crimes
such as conspiracy to commit genocide
or complicity in genocide. However, this
concern is not valid because although evidence of criminal activity in 1993 may support conviction for crimes in 1994, under
no circumstances can the ICTR actually
convict the accused for any crimes committed in 1993. The Trial Chamber’s denial
of the defense motion in Ngirabataware
was therefore proper, because the tribunal
has the authority to consider any relevant
evidence with probative value, irrespective

of whether the evidence may also relate to
crimes outside the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction.

ICTR Requests Amici Submissions in
Referral Cases
On November 4, 2010, the Office of
the Prosecutor (OTP) at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
requested to transfer the Uwinkindi,
Sikubwabo and Kayishema cases to
Rwandan national courts pursuant to
Rule 11 bis of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence. On January 17, 2011, the
ICTR decided to defer its decision on the
Sikubwabo and Kayishema referrals until
it reaches a final decision in Uwinkindi,
or until Sikubwabo or Kayishema, who
remain at large, are arrested. In seeking to
resolve the referral issue, the ICTR granted
permission to Human Rights Watch to
appear as amicus curiae in Uwinkindi,
and the International Criminal Defense
Attorneys Association and Rwanda in
Sikubwabo and Kayishema. Although the
extent to which amicus submissions influence the ICTR’s decisions has been unclear
in the past, the submissions concerning
the possible referral of these three cases to
Rwanda will likely influence the tribunal
because of its need to make informed decisions despite a limited capacity to independently evaluate Rwanda’s judicial and
penitentiary systems.
Traditionally, courts have regarded
amici curiae as impartial advisers, but,
in accordance with the prevailing modern
view, the ICTR acknowledged in Bagasora
that amicus briefs need not be impartial.
The lack of impartiality has been criticized because it may force parties to
address issues not otherwise raised, possibly impairing fair trials without advancing the interests of the court. The extent
to which amicus filings directly influence
the ICTR is unclear, as the tribunal rarely
references the submissions in its decisions
and judgments, perhaps because doing so
may indicate a lack of judge impartiality. Nevertheless, in their article “The
Role of Amicus Curiae before International
Criminal Tribunals,” Sarah Williams and
Hannah Woolaver suggest that amici influence prosecutorial discretion, which can
ultimately affect the outcome of a case.
For example, in Akayesu, the Coalition
for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict
submitted an amicus brief calling on the
Chamber to order the OTP to include
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sexual violence charges in the indictment.
Although the Trial Chamber did not issue
a decision on the admissibility of the brief,
the OTP subsequently sought to amend
the indictment to include sexual violence
charges, for which Akayesu was convicted.
In the three cases proposed for referral,
the amici submissions will not simply influence prosecutorial discretion, but they will
likely influence the ICTR judges’ decisions.
The ICTR requested the amici to address
specific issues, such as the effectiveness
of Rwanda’s witness protection system
and the adequacy of detention facilities
under international standards. Informed
decisions regarding the transfer of cases to
Rwanda require the tribunal to be familiar
with Rwandan laws and the extent to which
they are impartially enforced. Because
limited resources already impair the ICTR’s
progress on fulfilling core functions, it
would be unreasonable for the tribunal to
undertake its own complete evaluation of
the status of Rwanda’s judicial and penitentiary systems. Referring cases could
accelerate the tribunal’s fulfillment of its
completion strategy, but it should not be
done at the expense of ensuring respect
for the rights of the accused, victims, and
witnesses. Therefore, amici participation
in Uwinkindi, Sikubwabo and Kayishema
is necessary and valuable to ensure that the
ICTR appropriately determines whether to
refer the cases to Rwanda.

ICTR Admits Rwandan Government
Commentary on UN Mapping
Report
On March 31, 2011 in the Nzabonimana
case, Trial Chamber III of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
granted the Defense Motion for the
Admission of Documentary Evidence:
“Official Government of Rwanda
Comments on the UN Mapping Report
on the DRC” (Mapping Report). In light
of the purposes and methodology of the
Mapping Report and the ICTR’s limited
jurisdiction, the information included in
the report and related commentaries may
help contextualize the crimes alleged in the
ICTR but will not significantly affect the
tribunal’s proceedings.
In September 2010, the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) released the Mapping Report
to document basic information about the
most serious human rights abuses and
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violations of international humanitarian
law that occurred in eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) between
1993 and 2003. The Mapping Report
assesses the Congolese judicial system’s
ability to respond to the crimes, and identifies potential transitional justice mechanisms. The Report was not intended to
accuse individuals of criminal liability, but
to serve as a starting point for the DRC
to understand and recover from a history
of human rights abuses. To be included in
the Mapping Report, a human rights violation must have been reasonably suspected
to have occurred based on evidence from
two independent sources – proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was not necessary. Based
on the information gathered using these
criteria, the report alleged that Rwanda was
involved in perpetrating mass killings in the
DRC, among other human rights abuses.
The Rwandan government expressed its
complete disapproval of the report in an
official Commentary, stating that the methodology was flawed and that the historical

context had not been taken into account.
The Defense in Nzabonimana sought to
introduce portions of the Commentary
that described the activities of militias in
Rwanda as evidence.

Judgment Summaries: International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Rukundo’s first successful ground for
appeal was based on the Trial Chamber’s
reliance on the expansive definition of “committing” in the Gacumbitsi, Seromba, and
Ndindabahizi cases. The Trial Chamber
held that Rukundo’s actions were an integral part of the crimes, even though he
did not physically carry out any killing
or any infliction of serious bodily harm
to any of the victims. Rukundo argued
that the Trial Chamber erred by convicting him of “committing” genocide and
crimes against humanity under Article 6(1)
because he was not on notice that he was
being charged with “committing” these
crimes. The Prosecution argued that the
issue was whether Rukundo had sufficient
notice to prepare an effective defense, and
maintained that Rukundo was aware he
was being charged with “committing” the
relevant crimes. The Appeals Chamber
found that the indictment had only specifically charged Rukundo with ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting
the alleged crimes, and that therefore the
Trial Chamber had erred by convicting
Rukundo of “committing” genocide and
crimes against humanity. As a result, the
Appeals Chamber found him responsible
for aiding abetting, and not “committing,
genocide and murder and extermination as
crimes against humanity.

Emmanuel Rukundo v. The
Prosecutor, ICTR 2001-70-A
On October 20, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its
judgment in the case against Emmanuel
Rukundo, an ordained priest and military
chaplain for the Rwandan army during
the 1994 genocide. Rukundo was convicted of committing genocide for killing
Madame Rudahunga and causing serious
bodily harm to four Tutsis at Saint Joseph’s
College, abducting and killing Tutsis from
the Saint Léon Minor Seminary and for
sexually assaulting a Tutsi woman. The
Trial Chamber also convicted Rukundo
of murder as a crime against humanity
for Madame Rudahunga’s killing and for
extermination as a crime against humanity
for the abduction and killing of Tutsis from
the seminary. The Trial Chamber sentenced
Rukundo to twenty-five years in prison.
The Appeals Chamber dismissed seven of
Rukundo’s nine grounds for appeal and the
Prosecution’s sentencing appeal, ultimately
reducing Rukundo’s sentence from twentyfive to twenty-three years, including time
already served.

Pursuant to Rule 89(c) of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, a chamber
can admit any evidence that has probative value, meaning it tends to prove or
disprove an issue. Additionally, the evidence must be prima facie credible. The
Prosecution alleged that the Commentary
lacked probative value because it was
highly susceptible to political bias. The
Defense claimed that paragraph 8 of the
Commentary undermines the Prosecution’s
contention that various militias operated in
Gitarama, Rwanda in 1994, as alleged in
the indictment. The Prosecution asserted
that the Commentary was not reliable
because it lacked a signature, but the
Chamber found the Commentary prima
facie reliable because it is an official
government document on file with the
OHCHR. The Chamber further acknowl-
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edged that admissibility of the evidence
bears little relevance to the accuracy of
its contents or the weight that it will ultimately be accorded.
While the human rights abuses detailed
in the Mapping Report and Rwanda’s
responses in the Commentary may provide
context for crimes being prosecuted at the
ICTR, these documents will likely not be
significantly relevant to ICTR proceedings
particularly because the spatial and temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR precludes any
prosecution for crimes committed outside
of Rwanda during 1994. Nevertheless,
these documents and the controversy surrounding them underscore the far-reaching
effects of war and the related challenges
of achieving justice in societies that are
undergoing and recovering from violent
conflict.
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for
the Human Rights Brief.

Rukundo’s other successful ground of
appeal was his contention that the Trial
Chamber erred in convicting him of committing genocide by causing serious mental
harm to Witness CCH at the Saint Léon
Minor Seminary through sexual assualt.
Rukundo argued, inter alia, that the Trial
Chamber erred in finding he intentionally inflicted serious harm with genocidal
intent, because there was no evidence that
he targeted Witness CCH based on her ethnicity. At trial, the evidence established that
Witness CCH had approached Rukundo at
the seminary and asked that he hide her.
Rukundo responded that he could not help
her and informed her that her “entire family had to be killed” because her relative,
who was a former friend of Rukundo,
was assisting the “Inyenzi,” the derogatory name used to reference the Tutsis. He
then locked her in a room and sexually
assaulted her. The Trial Chamber found
that Rukundo’s statement that Witness
CCH’s “entire family had to be killed”
was proof of genocidal intent when considered in the general context of the mass
violence being perpetrated against Tutsis.
The Appeals Chamber, however, found
that while evidence that an accused used
expressions such as “Inyenzi” can, under
certain circumstances, establish genocidal
intent, “inferences drawn from circumstan-
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tial evidence must be the only reasonable
inference available.”
The Appeals Chamber held that genocidal intent was not the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from the circumstances, as Rukundo’s use of the word
“Inyenzi” could have been an expression
of anger that his former friend was affiliated with Tutsis and not necessarily an
expression of a personal desire to destroy
all Tutsis. This inference was supported
by the fact that Witness CCH had testified that Rukundo’s comment about her
family being killed did not frighten her
and that Rukundo later told Witness CCH
that he would have hidden her if he had
been able to. The majority of the Appeals
Chamber also disagreed with the Trial
Chamber’s reliance on the “general context of mass violence” in relation to this
incident. Specifically, the majority pointed
to the fact that, in relation to the other
incidents of genocide for which Rukundo
was convicted, there was evidence of systematic, repeated searches for Tutsis on
the basis of identity cards or lists, and the
subsequent killing or assault of the individuals identified through such searches.
By contrast, the sexual assault of Witness
CCH “appears to have been unplanned and
spontaneous.” Accordingly, the Appeals
Chamber reversed Rukundo’s conviction
for genocide by causing serious mental
harm through sexual harassment.
The seven unsuccessful grounds of
Rukundo’s appeal included allegations that
the Trial Chamber committed errors of
law, errors relating the alleged recantation
of a Prosecution witness, errors of law
and fact in evaluating the evidence, and
errors in sentencing. Regarding Rukundo’s
claim that the Trial Chamber erred in law
and fact in convicting him of genocide
and murder as a crime against humanity
for the events at Saint Joseph’s College,
the Appeals Chamber rejected Rukundo’s
argument that the causal elements of murder and serious bodily injury were not
proven, noting that the Appeals Chamber
had replaced Rukundo’s convictions for
committing these crimes with convictions for aiding and abetting. The Appeals
Chamber stressed that for purposes of
aiding and abetting, unlike committing,
there is “no requirement of a cause-effect
relationship between the conduct of the
aider and abettor and the commission of
the crime.” Rather, it is sufficient that the

aider and abettor’s actions had a “substantial effect” on the realization of the crime,
that the aider and abettor had knowledge
that his actions were assisting the principal
perpetrator of the crime, and, in the case
of specific intent crimes, that the aider and
abettor knew that the principal perpetrator
possessed the requisite intent.
Rukundo also argued that the Trial
Chamber erred by excluding only portions of a witness’s testimony rather than
her entire testimony. The Trial Chamber
had excluded a portion of the testimony
given by Witness BLJ, one of the victims
abducted at the college, regarding subse
quent events that occurred at Kabgayi
hospital, holding that the subject matter
of the testimony was not supported in the
indictment. The Trial Chamber had relied
on other portions of Witness BLJ’s testi
mony to support finding that Rukundo
was linked to the earlier attack at the
college. The Appeals Chamber held that
it was within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to find a particular piece of evidence
inadmissible with regard to a fact of which
the accused was not placed on notice, but
admissible in relation to other allegations
that had been sufficiently pleaded.
Rukundo also appealed his convictions
for genocide and extermination as a crime
against humanity at Saint Lèon Minor
Seminary, arguing that the convictions
were in error because the indictment did
not specify the identity of the abducted
victims or the dates of the abductions. The
Appeals Chamber found that, given the
large number of victims, their identification as “Tutsi refugees taken from Saint
Lèon Minor Seminary” was sufficiently
precise, and the date range of April to May
1994 was not unreasonably broad given
that Rukundo had visited the seminary on
four separate occasions during that period.
Rukundo further contended that the Trial
Chamber erred in its assessment of the
evidence in convicting him for his participation in the events at the seminary. The
Appeals Chamber, granting deference to
the discretion of the Trial Chamber, found
that there was no error in the evaluation of
the evidence that would occasion a miscarriage of justice.
Finally, finding that neither Rukundo
nor the Prosecution had demonstrated that
the Trial Chamber committed discernable
error in assessing Rukundo’s sentence,
the Appeals Chamber dismissed both
60

Rukundo’s appeal against the sentence
and the Prosecution’s request to increase
Rukundo’s twenty-five year sentence to
a life sentence. Recalling that it had dismissed the conviction for genocide by
causing serious mental harm to Witness
CCH, however, the Appeals Chamber
reduced Rukundo’s sentence to twentythree years.
Catlin Meade, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, wrote
this judgment summary for the Human Rights
Brief.

The Prosecutor v. Ildephonse
Hategekimana, ICTR-00-55B-T
On December 6, 2010, Trial Chamber II
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in the
case of Prosecutor v. Hategekimana. The
Chamber found Ildephonse Hategekimana
guilty of genocide, murder as a crime
against humanity, and rape as a crime
against humanity. The Chamber based
Hategekimana’s individual criminal
responsibility on direct participation
and actions as a superior, or Article 6(1)
and Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute
respectively. The Chamber sentenced him
to life imprisonment.
During 1994 genocide, Hategekimana
was Commander of the Ngoma Military
Camp, a lieutenant in the Rwanda Defense
Forces, the former national army, and a
member of the Butare Préfectoral Council,
which was responsible for peace and
security in the Ngoma Commune. The
Prosecution alleged that between April
7 and May 13, 1994, Hategekimana participated as a military official in a number
of incidents that supported its charges of
genocide and crimes against humanity,
including the killing and raping of members of the Tutsi population and Tutsi sympathizers; the erection of roadblocks for the
purpose of identifying, arresting, killing,
or seriously harming individuals carrying
Tutsi identification cards; the distribution
of weapons; the issuance of laissez-passer
(special emergency travel permits) to soldiers and others involved in the alleged
criminal acts; and, the endorsement of a
genocidal message through his attendance
at an inflammatory speech.
Of the fourteen alleged incidents, the
Chamber dismissed all but five. With
respect to the dismissed allegations, the
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Chamber found that the Prosecution had
failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hategekimana bore criminal responsibility
for the alleged acts.
Regarding the remaining five incidents,
Defense counsel argued that Hategekimana
could not be held responsible for any of the
alleged acts, each of which involved the
participation of soldiers from the Ngoma
Camp, for two reasons. First, counsel argued
that Hategekimana was not at Ngoma Camp
at the time the alleged crimes were committed. Several witnesses testified as to
Hategekimana’s hospitalization and recovery in April 1994 from war injuries. Second,
counsel argued that both Hategekimana
and the Ngoma Camp soldiers he allegedly led were injured, disabled, and sick,
thereby rendering their participation in
any of the alleged crimes impossible. The
Chamber found Hategekimana’s alibi lacking in credibility and held that he was
present during five of the alleged incidents.
The Chamber also found that the men at
the Ngoma Camp included both injured
and able-bodied soldiers and that the the
injured men were not precluded from committing any of the alleged acts.
As to Hategekimana’s convictions, the
Chamber found the accused guilty of both
genocide and murder as a crime against
humanity because of his participation in
a joint criminal enterprise with Ngoma
Camp soldiers, Interahamwe (a Hutu paramilitary group), and armed civilians on
three occasions. First, Hategekimana led
armed soldiers from the Ngoma Camp to
assist Interahamwe and armed civilians
in identifying and murdering three Tutsi
women on the night of April 23, 1994.
Second, he led Ngoma Camp soldiers in
a coordinated attack aimed at massacring
500 Tutsis at the Ngoma Parish on April
30, 1994. Third, Hategekimana ordered his
soldiers to assist in an attack that led to the
abduction and murder of more than twentyfive Tutsis at the Benebikira Convent on
April 30, 1994.
The Chamber determined that the
accused’s participation in the joint criminal
enterprise consisted of lending human
resources and ordering the killing of civilians, and it noted that “as the Ngoma
Camp Commander and a respected local
figure, Hategekimana’s presence and utterances on the various crime scenes had a
substantial effect on the killings which fol-

lowed.” Regarding the charges of genocide,
the Chamber found in each instance that
Hategekimana acted with genocidal intent.
With respect to the charges of murder as
a crime against humanity, the Chamber
found that he had knowledge that the killings formed part of a broader widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian
population on national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds. In addition,
the Chamber found that Hategekimana
acted with the requisite mens rea to bear
responsibility for murder as a crime against
humanity based on the fact that he ordered
Ngoma Camp soldiers to murder Jean
Bosco Rugomboka on April 8-9, 1994.
While the Chamber was also satisfied that
the accused bore responsibility for the
murder of Rugomboka under a theory of
superior responsibility, it indicated that
it would not sentence Hategekimana for
the crime under both a direct and superior theory of responsibility, in accordance
with prior ICTR jurisprudence. Finally,
Hategekimana was found guilty as a superior for the rape of Nura Sezirahiga as a
crime against humanity, based on a finding that the accused had effective control over the perpetrator of the rape, who
was a Ngoma Camp solider, and that
Hategekimana failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent the
rape or punish the perpetrator thereafter.
The Chamber took into account a number of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the decision to sentence
Hategekimana to life imprisonment. The
Chamber noted the well-established principle in the jurisprudence of both the ICTR
and the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia that an individual’s
personal position in the community should
be considered in the determination of an
appropriate sentence. Aggravating circumstances included Hategekimana’s local status, role as a superior, level of education,
and number of victims that resulted from
the killings. The Chamber found few mitigating factors, although it did give weight
to the fact that Hategekimana had a difficult childhood as an orphan and that he had
an arduous experience in battle as a soldier
for the Rwandan Army. Regardless of the
mitigating factors, the Chamber found the
gravity of the crimes and the aggravating
circumstances appropriate grounds to sentence Hategekimana to a single sentence of
life imprisonment.
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Elizabeth Francis, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, wrote this judgment summary for the
Human Rights Brief.

The Prosecutor v. Gaspard
Kanyarukiga, ICTR-2002-78-T
On November 1, 2010, Trial Chamber
II of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) delivered its judgment
in the case against Rwandan businessman
Gaspard Kanyarukiga. The Prosecution
brought three charges against Kanyarukiga
for his involvement in the attacks on Tutsi
civilians in the Kivumu commune at the
Nyange Parish on April 15-16, 1994: 1)
genocide, 2) complicity in genocide, and 3)
extermination as a crime against humanity.
The Chamber convicted Kanyarukiga of
genocide and extermination and sentenced
him to thirty years in prison.
The Prosecution alleged, and the
Chambers found, that following the death of
Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana
on April 6, 1994, Tutsi civilians were
attacked in their homes in the Kivumu
commune, and they subsequently sought
refuge in public buildings, including the
Nyange Parish Church. The Prosecution
also alleged that Kanyarukiga attended
meetings between April 10 and 16, 1994,
at which attacks against the Tutsi civilians
taking refuge in the Nyange Church were
planned, and that Kanyarukiga ordered
and instigated attacks on the civilians,
including the bulldozing of the church,
which resulted in the death of 2,000 Tutsi
civilians. Specifically, the Chamber found
that the Prosecution showed beyond a
reasonable doubt that attacks against Tutsi
civilians in the Kivumu commune occurred
after April 6, 1994.
The Prosecution also showed that armed
attackers surrounded the Nyange Church
on April 12, 1994, and that Kanyarukiga
was present at meetings at the Nyange
Parish on April 14, 1994. Kanyarukiga
was present after, but not during, attacks
perpetrated by Hutu assailants against the
Tutsi civilians in the Nyange Church and
an attempted burning of the church on
April 15, 1994. There was also sufficient evidence that Kanyarukiga attended
a meeting on April 16, 1994, at which the
destruction of the Nyange Church was discussed, and that he stated the church had to
be destroyed and he would rebuild it. The
Chamber found that on April 16, 1994,

Kuperstein et al.: Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Cou
the Nyange Church was destroyed using
at least one bulldozer, killing approximately 2,000 Tutsi civilians, although there
was not sufficient evidence to establish
that Kanyarukiga was present during the
destruction of the church. Ultimately, the
Chamber found that the destruction of the
Nyange Church and related attacks constituted genocide.
The Chamber did not accept
Kanyarukiga’s alibi, by which the defense
claimed that between April 12 and16, 1994,
the accused was busy securing travel documents in an effort to ensure the safety of
his family, and therefore not present at the
Nyange Parish during the meetings and
attacks against Tutsi civilians. The Defense
filed the notice of alibi after the presentation
of the Prosecution’s case, and did not finalize its list of witnesses until three months
later. Many of the witnesses who testified
in support of the alibi had an interest in the
positive outcome of the case because they
were related to, had business relations with,
or depended financially on Kanyarukiga.
Generally, the evidence presented by the
witnesses lacked inconsistencies, which the
Chamber typically expects when several
different people testify, and the evidence
was “too neatly tailored” to match the
Prosecution’s specific allegations. Finally,
the Chamber had misgivings about the route
Kanyarukiga purportedly took to secure
travel documents and locate his family.
The time Kanyarukiga claimed it took him
to travel was nearly double the time that
the Chamber found it would be while on a
site visit in 2010, and it was unlikely that
Kanyarukiga would have taken the “precarious, long and difficult” route with his
family, particularly given the insecurity in
Rwanda in April 1994. Because of these
factors, the Chambers found that the alibi
could not reasonably be true.
Regarding Kanyarukiga’s responsibility for genocide, the Prosecution alleged
that the accused bore responsibility, either
individually or as a member of a joint
criminal enterprise, pursuant to Article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute, which states that
“a person who planned, instigated, ordered,

committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the execution of [a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal] shall be
individually responsible for the crime.”
The Chamber determined that the planning mode of liability most accurately
captured Kanyarukiga’s alleged conduct.
To be convicted of planning, the accused,
either alone or with others, must design
criminal conduct that is later perpetrated,
the planning must substantially contribute
to the commission of genocidal acts, and
the accused must have the intent to plan the
commission of a crime or know that there
is a substantial likelihood that crime would
be committed.
Kanyarukiga’s participation in meetings at which attacks against the Tutsi
civilians were planned, and particularly
his statement that the Nyange Church had
to be destroyed and that he would rebuild
it, demonstrated that he helped plan the
criminal conduct that was later carried
out when the church was bulldozed. The
Chamber found that the plan to destroy
the church substantially contributed to the
commission of genocide because the bulldozing of the church resulted in the death
of 2,000 Tutsi civilians. Genocidal intent
can be inferred from the facts, so long as
it is the only reasonable inference available. The Chamber found that because
Kanyarukiga knew that Tutsi civilians taking refuge inside the church would be killed
if the church were destroyed, he acted with
the intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group
in whole or in part. The Chamber therefore
found Kanyarukiga guilty of genocide.
Although the Prosecution also charged
the accused with complicity in genocide,
the Chamber did not consider this count
because an accused cannot be convicted of
both genocide and complicity in genocide.
Turning to the charge of extermination
as a crime against humanity, the Chamber
reiterated that, under Article 3 of the ICTR
Statute, crimes against humanity must
be committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial
or religious grounds. Extermination is the

62

act of killing on a large scale, although there
is no numerical minimum that constitutes a
“large scale.” The Chamber found that the
destruction of the Nyange Church was
part of a widespread or systematic attack
against Tutsi civilians, that Kanyarukiga
knew his actions in planning the destruction of the church formed part of this
broader attack, that the killing of 2,000
Tutsis could “only be described as large
scale,” and that the accused intentionally
contributed to the killing of Tutsi civilians
on a large scale. Therefore, Kanyarukiga
was also guilty of extermination as a crime
against humanity.
To determine Kanyarukiga’s sentence,
the Chamber considered the gravity of the
offense, aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and past sentencing
practices of the Tribunal. The Chamber
did not find that Kanyarukiga deserved the
most severe sentence because, although
his conduct was grave, the Prosecution
did not establish that the accused directly
participated in, or was present during,
the destruction of the Nyange Church
and the resulting deaths of Tutsi civilians. However, the Chamber considered
the particular vulnerability of the victims,
who took refuge in a place of worship and
were prevented from escaping, an aggravating circumstance. The Chamber treated
Kanyarukiga’s age, which appeared to be
between 63 and 72 years, as a mitigating circumstance. The Chamber took into
account comparable sentencing practices
in similar cases. Individuals convicted of
genocide and extermination as a crime
against humanity have been sentenced for
twenty-five years to life imprisonment,
except where the accused pled guilty or
there were substantial mitigating factors.
Taking all of these factors into account, the
Chamber sentenced Kanyarukiga to thirty
years in prison for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity.
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, wrote this judgment summary for the
Human Rights Brief.

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 10

International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
Former Hostages of the Republika
Srpska Army Testify Against
KaradžiĆ
On February 2, 2011, former UN military observer Patrick Rechner testified at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) about his experience as one of over 200 UN staff members taken hostage by Republika Srpska
Army (VRS) forces in May and June of
1995. The prosecution alleges that the VRS
used the hostages as human shields at strategic military locations to prevent NATO
air strikes on those targets in violation
of jus in bello. Former Republika Srpska
President Radovan Karadžić is charged
with ordering the hostage taking and, in
the alternative, with failing to act once
made aware of it. While Karadžić argues
UN staff were captured and treated legitimately as prisoners of war, testimony from
numerous prosecution witnesses suggests
otherwise.
The taking of hostages in non-international conflicts is a grave breach of the laws
and customs of war codified in Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. There
are three elements of the crime of hostagetaking. A perpetrator must: (1) seize one
or more hostages, (2) control the hostages
and (3) intend to use the hostages to force
concessions from another party. Karadžić
is not the first defendant before the ICTY
to be charged with hostage-taking. In 2004,
the ICTY convicted Tihomir Blaškić of
taking civilian hostages with the intent
of forcing his opponent to cease military operations and of killing hostages.
The prosecution alleges that Karadžić and
former General Ratko Mladić centrally
controlled hostage-taking activities of the
VRS.
On the morning of May 26, 1995, VRS
forces captured Patrick Rechner and two
other members of his military observer
team in Pale, Bosnia. Rechner testified
that at the time of his capture, he called
Jovan Zametica, Karadzic’s senior political
advisor, who advised Rechner to cooperate
with his captors. The VRS transported the
hostages to an ammunition depot where the
VRS handcuffed the hostages to a lightning rod and the depot warehouse’s door.
The VRS repeatedly warned the hostages
that if NATO carried out air strikes, they

would either die in the attacks or be executed in retaliation. During the six hours
that Rechner was chained to a lightning
rod, he was visited by Zametica. In addition to Zametica’s visit, the widespread
hostage-taking and transport of hostages
supports an inference that a central controlling authority organized the hostage-taking
activities.
Karadžić argues that the UN peacekeepers and observers were members of a
“warring side,” and therefore their capture
and detention was legitimate under the
laws of war. During his cross-examination
of Rechner, Karadžić attempted to establish that VRS forces told Rechner that
he was being held as a prisoner of war
and given rights and privileges afforded
to prisoners of war. VRS forces granted
many requests of the hostages, including
requests for a visit from the International
Committee of the Red Cross, phone calls
home, visits from a doctor, and television
access. Rechner explained that the television access was for purposes of receiving
information from the media. Karadžić concluded his cross-examination by expressing empathy for Rechner’s ordeal, but also
maintained that his sympathies lay with
those affected by NATO airstrikes.

war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Đorđević’s was the fifth and final case at
the ICTY addressing atrocities in Kosovo.
The Trial Chamber found Đorđević individually criminally responsibility under
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute for the
crimes of forcible transfer of a population, murder, and persecution, as crimes
against humanity. The Chamber also found
Đorđević guilty of murder as a violation of
the laws and customs of war. The Chamber
convicted Đorđević under the doctrines of
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and aiding and abetting under Article 7(1). The
doctrine of JCE provides a mechanism for
establishing complete individual criminal
responsibility for acts that require coordinated action by multiple individuals. The
Chamber also stated that it alternatively
could have found him guilty under Article
7(3) of the statute for failure to prevent
and punish these crimes. Trial Chamber
II’s holding Đorđević responsible for these
crimes under a theory of JCE builds on
ICTY jurisprudence and illustrates how
the ICTY applies JCE.

ĐorĐeviĆ Sentenced under Joint
Criminal Enterprise for Kosovo
Atrocities

JCE is not defined in the ICTY’s statute. While the ICTY cites post-World
War II cases as the source of the doctrine of JCE, it largely developed in the
ICTY’s jurisprudence. Under Article 7(1)
of the ICTY Statute (Individual Criminal
Responsibility), “[a] person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall
be individually responsible for the crime.”
The ICTY ruled in the Tadić case that
Article 7(1) is supported by customary
international law and allows Chambers to
determine an accused’s guilt “as a principal or an accessory or otherwise as a participant.” Specifying where JCE falls under
Article 7(1), the Appeals Chamber held
in the Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction that JCE
is a form of criminal liability for “commission” of a crime. This substantially
expanded the meaning of “commission”
under Article 7(1) from the standard written into the ICTY Statute.

On February 23, 2011, Trial Chamber
II of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentenced former Serbian Assistant Minister
of Internal Affairs (MUP) and Public
Security Department (RJB) Chief Vlastimir
Đorđević to 27 years of imprisonment for

Applying a theory of JCE as a form of
“commission” requires satisfying distinct
elements. Establishing actus rea under a
theory of JCE involves three elements:
the existence of a group working towards
achieving a common purpose, the common
purpose of this group being the commis-

Regardless of whether Karadžić establishes that the UN staff held hostage by the
VRS were combatants under international
humanitarian law, it is likely that the ICTY
will find that the elements of the crime
of hostage-taking under Common Article
3 are satisfied. Testimony and evidence
adduced by the prosecution support the
conclusions that the VRS seized over 200
hostages, that hostages were under VRS
control, and that the VRS intended to use
the hostages to prevent UN air strikes on
VRS military installations. If the prosecution establishes that Karadžić and Mladić
centrally controlled hostage-taking activities, it is unlikely that Karadžić will be able
to successfully defend this charge.
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sion of a crime under the ICTY’s statute, and participation by the accused in
furthering this group’s goal of achieving
this common purpose. Under the variant
of JCE applied in this case (JCE 1), the
prosecution establishes the adequate mens
rea for commission of a given crime under
JCE when it demonstrates that the accused
intended to aid in perpetrating that crime
along with his co-perpetrators.
In Đorđević, the prosecution presented
evidence that, between March and June of
1999, Đorđević collaborated with other
top Serbian leaders in Kosovo to violently
drive out the ethnic Albanian population.
The prosecution asserted that Đorđević
had effective control over police forces in
Kosovo responsible for committing mass
atrocities including systematic shelling of
towns and villages, burning of villages
and farms, sexual assaults, and the ensuing deportation of approximately 800,000
Kosovar Albanians. The defense argued
that these crimes were not attributable to a
joint criminal enterprise and that, even if a
joint criminal enterprise existed, Đorđević
could not have significantly contributed to
a common plan because he lacked effective

control over MUP forces in Kosovo. The
defense asserted that the crimes committed were “isolated incidents perpetrated by
random individuals” and that coordinated
actions by Yugoslav army and MUP only
targeted “terrorist forces.”
Rejecting the defense’s arguments, the
Trial Chamber held that, “The nature of
the crimes that have been established and
the circumstances in which they were committed clearly demonstrates that the target
of this campaign was the Kosovo Albanian
population.” The Trial Chamber held that
Đorđević was a key participant in the
joint criminal enterprise because he exercised effective control over the police in
Kosovo and helped to conceal the murders
of Kosovo Albanians. Noting Đorđević’s
complete failure to investigate crimes committed by MUP forces and his aiding in
concealing the bodies of murdered Kosovo
Albanians, the Trial Chamber also found
Đorđević responsible for aiding and abetting the same crimes he was convicted of
under the theory of JCE. Furthermore,
the Trial Chamber stated that it would
have found Đorđević guilty under a theory
of command responsibility, ICTY Article
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7(3), if its finding of guilt under Article
7(1) had not precluded the Trial Chamber
from doing so.
The prosecution logically followed
expansive ICTY jurisprudence in establishing Đorđević’s guilt under a theory of
JCE. The tribunal established JCE to allow
prosecution under Article 7(1) (individual
criminal responsibility) in complex cases
where the prosecution would encounter
difficulty proving a more restrictive definition of “commission.” Given evidence of
the involvement of other Serbian leaders
and Đorđević’s involvement in the actions
of Serbian police and paramilitary forces, a
conviction under JCE was the prosecution’s
best possible strategy. A conviction under
aiding and abetting or for failure to prevent
and protect would have been unlikely to
result in such a substantial sentence. Thus,
Đorđević’s case illustrates the significance
of the development of JCE at the ICTY.
Ivan Carpio, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia for the Human Rights
Brief.

